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Abstract
Liberal egalitarian theories of justice argue that inequalities arising
from non-responsibility factors should be eliminated, but that inequal-
ities arising from responsibility factors should be accepted. The paper
discusses how the fairness argument for redistribution within a liberal
egalitarian framework is a¤ected by a relocation of the cut between
responsibility and non-responsibility factors. The paper also discusses
the claim that equalization of some non-responsibility factors will re-
duce the ideal level of redistribution.
1 Introduction
What should individuals be held responsible for? This question is at the heart
of liberal egalitarian theories of justice. These theories make a fundamen-
tal distinction between factors that individuals should be held responsible
for and factors that individuals should not be held responsible for, and they
share the view that inequalities arising from responsibility factors should
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be accepted, while inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors should
be eliminated (see, among others, Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), Cohen
(1989), Le Grand (1991), Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998), Bossert (1995), Fleur-
baey (1994, 1995 a,b,c,d) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). They disagree,
however, on where to draw the responsibility cut.
The location of the responsibility cut is essential in liberal egalitarian
reasoning because it a¤ects the ideal level of redistribution. This is most
easily seen by noticing the implications of the liberal egalitarian framework
in two extreme cases. No redistribution would be justi…able if all factors
are responsibility factors, while, ideally, liberal egalitarians would aim at
equalizing outcomes completely if all factors are non-responsibility factors. If
there are both responsibility factors and non-responsibility factors, however,
then the ideal level of redistribution also depends on the degree of inequality
in the non-responsibility factors. For example, if there were no inequality in
the non-responsibility factors, then there would be no reason to redistribute
resources in a liberal egalitarian society.
In sum, in a liberal egalitarian society, the ideal level of redistribution de-
pends both on the location of the responsibility cut and the level of inequality
in non-responsibility factors. It may then seem reasonable to make the fol-
lowing two claims. First, the ideal level of redistribution is lower if people
are held responsible for more factors. More responsibility should, in other
words, imply less redistribution. Second, the ideal level of redistribution is
lower if the di¤erences in some non-responsibility factor are eliminated. More
equality in one dimension of non-responsibility should, in other words, imply
less redistribution.
The main result of this paper is that the …rst of these two claims does
not hold in general. There will be situations in which increased responsibility
results in the need for more redistribution (and equivalently less responsibility
results in the need for less redistribution). The underlying intuition of this
proposition is related to the less surprising result that the second claim also
is false. After presenting the basic framework, where we introduce a formal
way of modeling the relocation of the responsibility cut, we therefore start by
establishing, in section 3, that there will be situations in which equalization
of one dimension of non-responsibility increases the need for redistribution.
In section 4, we then prove that the …rst claim is false, that is, that increased
(reduced) responsibility does not necessarily result in the need for less (more)
redistribution, and explain, using the insight from section 3, the intuition
behind this. In the concluding section, we discuss how our analysis may shed
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some light on the political debate on redistributive policy.
2 The basic framework
Consider a society with a population N = f1; :::; ng, n ¸ 2, where individual
outcomes are determined by three types of factors. We shall refer to these
factors as e¤ort, talent (or natural abilities) and social background, but they
may also be given other interpretations.1 Let -E = fe1; e2; :::g be the set
of possible e¤ort levels, -T = ft1; t2; :::g the set of possible talent levels,
and -S = fs1; s2; :::g the set of possible social background levels. We also
simplify by considering outcome as de…ned by a person’s income. The pre-
tax income function f : - ! <, where < is the income space and - =
-E£-T £-S ; is assumed to be strictly increasing in all three variables (i.e.,
f(e2; t1,s1) > f(e1; t1,s1), and similarly for talent and social background).
Moreover, we assume that for some e¤ort level, it is possible to compensate
an unfortunate social background with a high talent (i.e., for some e1 2 -E ,
t1; t2 2 -T , s1; s2 2 -S, f(e1; t1; s2) = f(e1; t2; s1)).
Let ai = (aEi = e; aTi = t; aSi = s); be a characteristics vector of person i
and a = (a1; :::; an) a characteristics pro…le of society in a particular situation.
Let -N be the set of all possible characteristics pro…les of society. Both
proofs rely on a some very weak richness assumptions on the set of all possible
characteristics pro…les. We state these assumptions formally in the appendix,
together with the proofs of the two propositions.
The aim of the analysis is to study how the location, and relocation, of
the responsibility cut should a¤ect the fairness argument for redistribution
within a liberal egalitarian framework. For this purpose, we rule out incen-
tive considerations, which we do by assuming that the factors under personal
control are una¤ected by the design of the redistribution mechanism. This
implies that all allocations of post-tax income will be Pareto optimal (as
long as we assume that people have self-interested preferences and a positive
marginal utility of income). We will refer to the optimal level of redistribu-
tion in this situation as the ideal level of redistribution, that is, the level of
1The model and the results can easily be generalized to situations with more than
three types of factors and to situations where the factors are multidimensional. The
factors can also be given other interpretations. We may for example substitute talent and
social background with two di¤erent aspects of people’s talent, e.g., people’s IQ and their
physical strength.
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redistribution which should take place if we only needed to take into account
liberal egalitarian fairness considerations.
In formalizing the responsibility cut, it is useful to introduce the set RP ,
which is a power set of the set R containing the three parameters E; T; S . Any
set r 2 RP gives us the factors people are held responsible for, e.g., r = fEg
represents that people are only held responsible for e¤ort, ~r = fE; Tg that
people are held responsible for both talent and e¤ort, and so on. Hence, we
have a relocation of the responsibility cut when we move from r to ~r, where
such a relocation gives people more responsibility whenever r ½ ~r.
In sum, our object of study can be described as a redistribution mecha-
nism F : -N £RP ! <n. We assume that F satis…es the no-waste conditionPn
i=1 Fi(a; r) =
Pn
i=1 f(ai), 8a 2 -N.
In this framework, liberal egalitarian ethics can be seen as consisting of
two parts; the principle of equalization and the principle of responsibility. The
core egalitarian intuition underlying liberal egalitarianism is the idea that
individuals who are identical with respect to all responsibility factors, should
have the same outcome. In our model this implies that all individuals who are
identical with respect to all variables in the responsibility set r 2 RP , should
have the same post-tax income. We can state this principle of equalization
as follows.
Equal Income for Equal Responsibility Factors (EIERF): For any a 2 -N ,
r 2 RP and j; k 2 N; if aIj = aIk for all I 2 r, then Fj(a; r) = Fk(a; r):
EIERF is not inconsistent with huge inequalities in income as long as these
inequalities correspond to di¤erences in responsibility factors, and hence is
a much weaker requirement than strict egalitarianism. EIERF, however,
implies strict egalitarianism if r is empty (i.e., if individuals are not held
responsible for anything). If r = fE; S; Tg (i.e., if individuals are responsible
for everything), then EIERF implies formal equality or anonymity, and thus
is consistent with no redistribution at all. Hence, the framework covers a
wide range of normative perspectives.
The interpretation of the principle of responsibility is a controversial is-
sue (see Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), Cappelen and Tungodden (2003,
2004a,b), Tungodden (2004)), but any reasonable interpretation should imply
that persons exercising more responsibility should receive a higher post-tax
income than people exercising less responsibility.
Minimal Reward (MR): For any a 2 -N ; r 2 RP and j; k 2 N; if aIj ¸ aIk
for all I 2 r and aIj > aIk for some I 2 r, then Fj(a; r) > Fk(a; r):
MR is empty if r is empty, i.e., if there is no factor that we hold people
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responsible for, then there is no basis for rewarding people. In this case, MR
is consistent with strict egalitarianism.
3 Equalization of a non-responsibility factor
Social and technological developments may contribute to equalization of non-
responsibility factors. It is for example commonly argued that the quality of
elementary education should be considered beyond the control of individuals.
If so, then the development of a public school system may move us in a
direction where we have more equality in educational background in society.
Similarly, the development of a public system of health provision may reduce
inequality in health, or modern genetics may make it possible to equalize
some parts of people’s genetic abilities (if the technology is made broadly
available).
How should such a development a¤ect the level of redistribution in so-
ciety? As noted in the introduction, we might expect equalization of some
non-responsibility factors to result in a reduction in the ideal level of com-
pensatory redistribution. Formally, we can state this intuition as follows.
More Equality in a Non-responsibility factor, Less Redistribution (MENLR):
For any a; ~a 2 -N , r 2 RP ; if (1) for some I =2 r, there exist j,k such that
aIj 6= aIk, (2) ~aIi = ~aIj for all i 2 N, and (3) aJi = ~aJi for all i 2 N and all
J 6= I 2 R, then jFi(a; r)¡ f (ai)j ¸ jFi(~a; r) ¡ f (~ai)j for all i 2 N:
MENLR consists of three premises; the …rst states that there is inequality
in one non-responsibility factor in the initial situation a, the second states
that this inequality has been removed when we consider the situation ~a, and
the third states that this is the only thing that has taken place when we move
from a to ~a. Given these three premises, MENLR states that there should
be less redistribution in ~a than a.
Even though it may seem plausible that equalization in a non-responsibility
factor should reduce the need for redistribution, it turns out that MENLR
does not hold within a liberal egalitarian framework.
Proposition 1 There does not exist any F satisfying EIERF and MENLR.
Proof. See Appendix.
The underlying intuition is rather straightforward. By equalizing a non-
responsibility factor, one may actually increase the overall level of inequality
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in non-responsibility factors, and thus increase the ideal level of redistrib-
ution. The proposition establishes that this can happen within any liberal
egalitarian system satisfying EIERF. Whether this actually will be the case
in a particular situation, is an empirical question. This somewhat para-
doxical result depends on there being negative correlation between various
dimensions constituting a person’s circumstances. For example, it may hap-
pen if we have negative correlation between social background and talent or
between various dimensions of people’s talent.
In any case, the result shows us that we have to be careful in analyzing the
e¤ects of partial equalization. In particular, it is important to analyze how
di¤erent non-responsibility factors are correlated with each other. Starting
from a situation with inequality in many non-responsibility factors, there
will not necessarily be a monotonic path towards overall equality if we were
to equalize one dimension at a time. This insight will also be useful in the
analysis of the e¤ect of a relocation of the responsibility cut.
4 Relocation of the responsibility cut
A relocation of the responsibility cut may arise for two types of reasons.
First, it may arise because there is a change in the principles that underlie
the assignment of individual responsibility. Second, it may change because
one reconsiders the implications of a given principle. Such reconsiderations
may be necessary either as a result of social or technological developments
or as a result of a change in our believes about the world. To illustrate,
consider the standard view that people should be held responsible only for
factors under their control. Given this principle, the responsibility cut can be
altered in two fundamentally di¤erent ways. First, it can be altered due to
technological or social developments. Changes in the labor market and the
development of modern medicine provide two examples. Historically, people’s
profession was to a large degree determined by their parents’ profession or
social background. Increased social mobility has given people more control
over this factor. Deregulation of the labor market has also given people
more freedom to determine how many hours they want to work. These
developments have in other words shifted some factors from the set of factors
outside individual control to the set of factors within individual control.
Medical research may also potentially relocate the responsibility cut. An
obvious example is technologies that allow people to change the way they
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look, e.g., by the use of hormones, implants or other techniques. Modern
genetics provide the most radical prospect for relocating the cut between re-
sponsibility and non-responsibility factors (see also Buchanan et. al. (2000)).
Targeted alterations of genomes may, for example, turn o¤ some genes that
causally contribute to the emergence of certain illnesses. This new technol-
ogy thus makes it possible for the individual to a¤ect factors that previously
were outside her control. If people were given free access to such technology,
this would imply that new factors moved from the set of non-responsibility
factors to the set of responsibility factors.
The responsibility cut can also be relocated in an epistemic way, by new
knowledge. Developments in for example psychology, sociology and medicine
a¤ect which factors we view as under or outside the control of individual
agents. This can again perhaps most easily be illustrated by developments
in modern genetics. Advances in molecular genetics over the past decade
have been remarkable. The entire human genome has been sequenced and
many of the genetic loci associated with human disease are identi…ed. Genetic
research has greatly enhanced our understanding of disease mechanisms, and
this is likely to have profound e¤ects on our ability to characterize more
clearly the causes of disease and how this relates to di¤erent factors within our
outside individual control (Bell 1998). For example, a factor that we thought
was under individual control, may turn out to be determined by certain
genetic traits. In this way, new knowledge may change the way we think of
circumstances and choice. Given that people’s health also a¤ect individual
productivity, such a relocation of the responsibility cut may radically a¤ect
our redistributive policies of income.2
As noted in the introduction, it seems reasonable to argue that if a reloca-
tion of the responsibility cut implies that people to a greater extent are held
responsible for the factors determining their outcome, then they should also
to a greater extent bear the consequences of their choices. Similarly, if we
move towards a situation where we consider people to be responsible for less,
then it seems reasonable to argue that there should be more redistribution.
Formally, we can capture this intuition by the following condition.
More Responsibility Less Redistribution (MRLR): For any a 2 -N ; r; ~r 2
RP ; if r ½ ~r, then jFi(a; r)¡ f (ai)j ¸ jFi(a; ~r)¡ f (ai)j for all i 2 N:
Suppose that r = fEg and ~r = fE; Tg. In this case, r ½ ~r, and people
2 It may of course also a¤ect our design of health policies, see Cappelen and Norheim
(2004).
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have more responsibility if we rely on ~r and not r. MRLR states that if the
only thing that takes place is that we relocate our responsibility cut in this
way, then each person’s post-tax income should be closer to his or her pre-tax
income, that is, there should be less redistribution. Surprisingly, it turns out
that MRLR does not hold within a liberal egalitarian framework.
Proposition 2 There does not exist any F satisfying EIERF, MR and MRLR.
Proof. See appendix:
Proposition 2 shows that increased responsibility does not necessarily
result in less redistribution within a liberal egalitarian framework.3 The
underlying intuition is closely related to the intuition captured in Proposition
1. To make people responsible for a factor may be seen as the removal of
one potential source of inequality in non-responsibility factors. If there are
negative correlations between various non-responsibility factors, then this
may actually contribute to increase overall inequality in circumstances, which
would increase the ideal level of redistribution.
However, there is another important point captured by Proposition 2.
When we make people responsible for a new factor, then we may also alter
our views on who is exercising a high level of responsibility in society. For
example, if the responsibility cut is relocated so as to shift talent from the
group of non-responsibility factors to the group of responsibility factors, then
those who have a high talent will be viewed as comparatively more respon-
sible and those who have a low talent will be viewed as comparatively less
responsible. This type of change may initiate more redistribution, at least as
long as we stay within a liberal egalitarian framework satisfying the demand
of minimal reward.
In sum, Proposition 2 shows that we cannot take for granted that tech-
nological, social, epistemological or ideological developments that shift some
factor from the non-responsibility to the responsibility set will reduce the
need for redistribution of income.
3Notice that strict egalitarianism satis…es both EIERF and MRLR, libertarianism sat-
is…es MR and MRLR, and a number of mechanisms (for example all the egalitarian equiv-
alent mechanisms satisfy EIERF and MR (see Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). Hence, all
the three conditions are needed in order to establish an impossibility.
8
5 Concluding remarks
We have established that partial equalization of non-responsibility factors
or the assignment of more responsibility to people do not necessarily imply
less need for redistribution. We believe these to be interesting observations
in a discussion of how we should expect liberal egalitarian redistributive
policies to respond to fundamental technological, social or epistemological
developments challenging our views on individual responsibility.
But the results may also add some insight into the present political debate
on redistribution. Typically, right-wingers argue that people should be held
responsible for a large fraction of the factors in‡uencing their lives, whereas
left-wingers hold individuals responsible for a smaller set of factors. Given
these views, there has been a clear tendency for people on the right-wing to
be less supportive of redistribution than people on the left-wing.
The di¤erence between these two perspectives may be seen as a disagree-
ment about where to locate the responsibility cut. Our analysis shows that
in general we should not expect a monotonic relationship between the de-
gree of responsibility assigned to people and the ideal level of redistribution,
unless there are no negative correlations between various non-responsibility
factors. Hence, liberal egalitarian theory does not support the claim that a
move to the right necessarily should imply less redistribution (or similarly,
that a move to the left necessarily should make us more supportive of redis-
tribution). Such generalizations either rely on misconstrued ideas about the
relationship between responsibility and redistribution or on empirical claims
that need veri…cation.
6 Appendix
6.1 The richness assumption
Both proofs rely on a very weak richness assumption on the set of all possible
characteristics pro…les. It says that the redistribution function should cover
a situation where we can divide society into two groups; one group being
more talented but with a more unfortunate social background and the other
group being less talented but with a more fortunate background, but where
the groups exercise the same level of e¤ort and have the same pre-tax income.
In addition, in the proof of Proposition 1, we also have to assume that we
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may consider a situation where we have equalized their social background.
Formally, this can be stated as saying that for some e1 2 -E , t1; t2 2 -T ,
and s1; s2 2 -S, there exist a; ~a 2 -N such that ai = (e1; t2; s1) for all
i = 1; :::; k and ai = (e1; t1; s2) for all i = k + 1; :::; n, where f(e1; t1; s2) =
f(e1; t2; s1), and ~ai = ai for all i = 1; :::; k and ~ai = (e1; t2; s2) for all i =
k + 1; :::; n.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
By assumption, there exist a; ~a 2 -N such that ai = (e1; t2; s1) for all
i = 1; :::; k and ai = (e1; t1; s2) for all i = k + 1; :::; n, where f(e1; t1; s2) =
f(e1; t2; s1), and ~ai = ai for all i = 1; :::; k and ~ai = (e1; t2; s2) for all
i = k + 1; :::; n. We will only prove the result in the two-person case, the
extension to the many person case being straightforward. Hence, k = 1 and
n = 2. Consider r = fEg :
(i) By EIERF , F1(a; r) = F2(a; r).
(ii) By the e¢ciency of F , F1(a; r) +F2(a; r) = f(a1)+ f (a2), and hence,
taking into account (i) and the assumption that f(a1) = f(a2), we have that
F1(a; r) = f(a1) and F2(a; r) = f(a2).
(iii) By EIERF , F1(~a; r) = F2(~a; r).
(iv) By the fact that f is strictly increasing in t, we have that f(~a2) >
f(a2). Moreover, by assumption, f(a1) = f (~a1). By the e¢ciency of F ,
F1(~a; r) + F2(~a; r) = f(~a1) + f(~a2) > f(a1) + f (a2). Hence, taking into
account (iii), F1(~a; r) > 12[f (a1)+f(a2)] = f(a1). But, given (ii), this violates
MENLR, and the result follows.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
By assumption, there exists a 2 -N such that ai = (e1; t2; s1) for all i =
1; :::; k and ai = (e1; t1; s2) for all i = k + 1; :::; n, where f (e1; t1; s2) =
f(e1; t2; s1): We will only prove the result in the two-person case, the ex-
tension to the many person case being straightforward. Hence, k = 1 and
n = 2:
(i) Consider r = fEg. By EIERF , F1(a; r) = F2(a; r).
(ii) By the e¢ciency of F , F1(a; r) +F2(a; r) = f(a1)+ f (a2), and hence,
taking into account the assumption that f(a1) = f(a2), we have that F1(a; r) =
f(a1) and F2(a; r) = f(a2).
(iii) Consider ~r = fE; Tg. By MR, F1(a; ~r) > F2(a; ~r):
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(iv) By the e¢ciency of F , F1(a; r) +F2(a; r) = F1(a; ~r) +F2(a; ~r): Con-
sequently, taking into account (i) and (ii), F1(a; ~r) > F1(a; r) and F2(a; ~r) <
F2(a; r):
(v) By (ii) and (iv), F1(a; ~r) > F1(a; r) = f(a1) and f(a2) = F2(a; r) >
F2(a; ~r). But this violates MRLR, and the result follows.
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